By Mikayla Watts ‘26

Introduction

The Supreme Court case United States v. Thind was one that largely focused on the aspect of race and nationality in relation to immigration. The Supreme Court, headed by Chief Justice William Taft, looked at two pieces of legislation in this case, interpreting the Naturalization Act of 1790, and further, the Immigration Act of 1917. In short, it was concluded that those of Indian nationality were not legally considered white, which impacted citizenship eligibility in the United States.

The Taft Court

William Taft spent much of his career in politics before he served as President of the United States. In 1921, eight years after Taft left office, President Warren Harding nominated Taft for Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. The Taft Court is mostly known for its value placed on economic freedom, which led them to “strike down many forms of regulation,” according to Professor Robert Post of Yale Law School. Despite their prominent view on the economy, they decided other landmark cases dealing with differing issues, including immigration and citizenship.

Relevant Legislation

To understand the state of immigration in the United States at this time, it is vital to understand what pieces of legislation had authority. The Immigration Act of 1917 at its core, established the formal process to become a citizen of the United States, as well as ramifications for any violations. It also described characteristics of those who could not be granted citizenship in the United States. The Naturalization Act was another piece of legislation which was enacted in 1790 and subsequently amended in later years. In this case, the Court interpreted the language of § 2169, Revised Statutes, which was one of those amendments. This section, according to the Court, authorized citizenship to “aliens being free white persons and to aliens of African nativity and…of African descent.” This is the language at the center of the Court’s opinion and its basis for rationale, which led to a unanimous decision. 

A Challenge to Citizenship

Bhagat Singh Thind was of Indian origin and immigrated to the United States. The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon granted Thind citizenship, despite the lack of approval from the United States Natural Examiner. The appellant, the United States, turned to the Naturalization Act of 1790’s language of “white persons,” contending that Thind did not fall under this category. The appellant asked the district court to rescind Thind’s grant for citizenship. This resulted in the district court granting the defense’s motion to dismiss, leading the government to appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and finally reaching the Supreme Court. 

The Decision

The Court was presented with two questions to answer in this case: 1. “‘Is a high-caste Hindu born at Amritsar, Punjab, India’” considered a white person under § 2169, Revised Statutes? 2. Are Indians who entered the United States legally, before the passage of the Immigration Act of 1917, now barred from naturalization in the country? The second question largely refers to § 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917, often referred to as the “barred zone act,” which excluded any “natives of any country…on the Continent of Asia.” This decision was unanimous, as the Court held for the first question, no, the qualifications that Thind held did not meet the qualifications of a white person as it relates to § 2169 of the 1790 Naturalization Act. The Court determined that this answer rendered the second question moot. Since both pieces of legislation, as interpreted by the Court, exclude those of Asian origin from United States citizenship, the Court felt that an answer to the second question would be repetitive.

The Court’s Interpretation

In writing the majority opinion, Justice George Sutherland began by simplifying the conditions upon which eligibility for Thind rests by stating, “if the applicant is a white person within the meaning of this section, he is entitled to naturalization, otherwise not.” With this, the task that was in front of the Court at this point was to determine what “white person” meant within the context of § 2169 Revised Statutes. 

Sutherland defines vital language in relation to the 1790 Act, and begins with the word “race.” Sutherland determines that the word in this context cannot wholly relate to ancestry, but rather is a word that is defined by “requisite characteristics” of people. So, rather than relying on a common ancestry for eligibility, Sutherland and the Court looked to the necessary physical characteristics to fulfill the meaning of “white persons,” as they suspect that the framers of the legislation did. Later on in the opinion, Sutherland concedes that race is not something that can simply be put into “sharply bound divisions,” as it oftentimes cannot be concretely defined. Due to this, the term “white” must be interpreted by the Court in the way the framers likely understood it, as well as how many others understand the term. With this, Sutherland concludes that the framers’ understanding of who was considered white was “almost exclusively from the British Isles and Northwestern Europe,” likely only extending their considerations further into other parts of Europe. Sutherland later relies on the idea that in a practical sense, those who are “commonly recognized as white,” when looking at the characteristics of these early immigrants, are “readily distinguishable” from Thind and other Indians.

Sutherland acknowledges Thind’s contention that he is eligible for citizenship due to his identification of Caucasian and Aryan. Sutherland dissects the word “Aryan” and concludes that the word in and of itself is not relevant in race, but rather language. In fact, Sutherland says that there is a possibility that the language was spoken by many different races, meaning that the ability to identify with this term is “altogether inadequate to prove common racial origin.” In addressing the term “Caucasian,” Sutherland points out the fact that the word was likely not considered by the framers when writing this legislation, and therefore did not consider the scientific meaning of the word. It is because of this, the Court chooses to employ the word in its popular sense and apply it to Thind’s case. In applying the word in as it is commonly used, Sutherland concludes that “Caucasian” is interchangeable with “‘free white persons,’” which “does not include the body of people to whom the appellee belongs.”

With all considerations of technical wording and definitions in mind, Sutherland sums up the Court’s interpretation of the Naturalization Act as better to be left “as they are than to risk undue extension or undue limitation of their meaning.” In taking the language of the statute at face value, as well as looking into the intentions of the framers, Sutherland, along with the eight other justices agreed that Thind and those who share his characteristics are not “white” under the language of § 2169, Revised Statutes, and therefore are not eligible for citizenship in the United States. 

Sutherland cites Ozawa v United States, 1922, to support the Court’s holding. This case presented a similar situation, in which a Japanese man was denied citizenship when the Court considered the same language. In Thind Sutherland cites Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1819 as it is used in Ozawa. In writing the opinion for Ozawa, Sutherland applied Marshall’s method of legal interpretation in Dartmouth College to the question of race and citizenship in Ozawa. Sutherland relied upon the language of Dartmouth College in the rationale for Ozawa, and stated that “the framers did not have in mind the brown or yellow races of Asia,” and if they did, the act would have explicitly addressed them. To apply this idea to the case presented in Ozawa, Sutherland contends that the framers only intended for “persons whom the fathers knew as white,” to be eligible for citizenship. 

Sutherland points to more support of this holding with the Immigration Act of 1917. He addresses the part of the Act that clearly excludes those of Asian origin, which includes India. Sutherland contends that this is “evidence of the congressional attitude,” which is a disapproval of Immigration from these countries. Sutherland shows this as evidence of the general standpoint of this issue, further validating the Court’s interpretation of the framers.

Subsequent Effects

Following Thind, immigration laws in the United States became more restrictive, especially when looking at subsequent legislation. The Immigration Act of 1924 was enacted just one year after the decision. The Act reinforced the ineligibility of many groups to obtain citizenship in the United States, meaning that the infamous “barred zone act” was still in effect. Furthermore, the Act addressed § 2169, Revised Statutes, upholding any prohibitions determined under the section. Another major aspect of the Act is that it instilled “quota immigrants,” which limited immigration into the country, depending on nationality.

Over twenty years later, the Luce-Celler Act was passed in 1946, which finally lifted the prohibition on immigration and naturalization for those of Indian nationality. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 upheld the quota system, but sections of the Act further progressed the opportunities for foreigners who were formerly banned from obtaining citizenship in the United States. Section 311 disallows citizenship to be “denied or abridged because of race,” meaning the race issue dealt with and concluded upon in Thind was now irrelevant. 

Immigration Legislation Today

Though amended many times throughout the years, the final major piece of legislation on immigration is the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. In its amended version, it outlines the operation for immigration in the United States today. The Act proves to be even more inclusive in who can obtain citizenship, as it states that neither race nor nationality can provoke preference or discrimination in the immigration process. It also eliminated the quota system for immigration and naturalization. 

Conclusion

United States v. Thind was a decision that was presented at a time in the country’s history when immigration was highly regulated. The decision brought attention to race and how that aspect played a factor when it came to the immigration process in the United States. In interpreting language articulated by the founding fathers, the Court determined that Thind, a “high-caste Hindu,” was not white in the eyes of the law. This affected immigration in the following years, as restrictions were reinforced for certain groups of people, which made naturalization more difficult. Following that legislation however, lawmakers progressively turned away from the question of race and nationality when it came to immigration in the United States, until it became a non-factor.

Mikayla Watts is a junior majoring in criminal justice and philosophy.

Sources

A Conversation with Robert Post on the Taft Court. (2023, December 14). National Constitution Center. Retrieved May 21, 2025 from https://constitutioncenter.org/media/files/A_Conversation_with_Robert_Post_on_the_Taft_Court_WTP_transcript.pdf 

An Act to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes. Pub. L. No. 89-236 § 2, 79 Stat., (1965). https://www.congress.gov/bill/89th-congress/house-bill/2580/text?s=3&r=1&q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22immigration+and+nationality+act%22%7D 

Echoes of Freedom: South Asian Pioneers in California, 1899-1965. (2020, July 6). Berkeley Library University of California. Retrieved May 20, 2025 from https://guides.lib.berkeley.edu/echoes-of-freedom/citizenship 

Immigration Act of 1917 (Barred Zone Act). (n.d.). Illinois Library. Retrieved May 18, 2025 from https://omeka-s.library.illinois.edu/s/ias/item/3819#?c=&m=&s=&cv=

Immigration Act of 1924. (1924, May 26). San Diego State University. Retrieved May 18, 2025 from https://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1924ImmigrationAct.pdf 

Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 311, 66 Stat., (1952) https://www.congress.gov/bill/82nd-congress/house-bill/5678/text

Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922). (n.d.). Justia. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/260/178/ 

The Life and Presidency of William Howard Taft. (n.d.). The White House Historical Association. Retrieved May 20, 2025 from https://www.whitehousehistory.org/the-life-and-presidency-of-william-howard-taft 

The Taft Court, 1921-1930. (n.d.). Supreme Court Historical Society. Retrieved May 12, 2025 from https://supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-courts/taft-court-1921-1930/

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). (n.d.). Justia. Retrieved May 21, 2025 from https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/17/518/ 

United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923). (n.d.). Justia. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/261/204/