Pleading Away Due Process: Plea Bargaining in North Carolina

By Avery Sneed ‘27

Introduction

Every year, more than 90% of all federal and criminal cases are resolved through a plea bargain. In North Carolina this rate is even higher, reaching 95% on average in recent years. In fiscal year 2022, 98% of North Carolina’s criminal cases were resolved by plea deals, underscoring the system’s reliance on negotiated justice. As caseloads grow and trials become increasingly scarce, plea bargaining has evolved from an alternative to trial to the primary mode of criminal case resolution. To understand the legal and constitutional stakes involved, we must unpack the structure of the practice. What does a plea bargain entail, what rights are waived in the process, and how do those waivers affect a defendant's ability to fight against them?

What is a Plea Bargain? 

A plea bargain is a negotiated agreement between a defendant and a prosecutor in which the defendant waives their constitutional right to a trial in exchange for a reduced sentence or lesser charges. In most cases, prosecutors will agree to drop certain charges or downgrade their severity in return for the defendant’s guilty plea. In some instances, the agreement may also require the defendant to testify against a co-defendant as a condition of the deal. Proponents of plea bargaining argue that it conserves judicial resources, reduces costs, and expedites case resolution. Trials are often lengthy and expensive, and plea deals offer a faster alternative. Supporters also point to the certainty plea deals offer: prosecutors are guaranteed a conviction, and defendants can avoid the risk of a harsher sentence if found guilty at trial.

What Rights Are Waived in a Plea Deal?

The benefits of plea bargains come with a hefty price. Entering into a plea bargain requires defendants to waive three fundamental rights protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments: the right to a jury trial, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. This bundle of waivers forms the foundation of a guilty plea, one that courts are required to examine carefully to ensure the defendant is making an informed and voluntary decision. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that plea bargains must be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” In Boykin vs. Alabama (1969), the Court emphasized that judges must ensure that defendants understand the rights they’re forfeiting when pleading guilty. This principle is echoed in North Carolina law. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022, trial judges are required to personally address defendants in open court and confirm that their plea was made voluntarily, and ensure that the defendant knows the consequences and nature of the plea. 

However, the practical application of these protections is not always robust. Research done by the Kerner Commission (1967) explained that these waivers are usually “informal, highly discretionary, and mostly invisible,” with little inquiry as to whether the defendant has full knowledge of all material facts, including potentially exculpatory evidence. This issue is dually hampered by the decision in United States vs. Ruiz (2002), which held that the Constitution does not require prosecutors to disclose impeachment or even some exculpatory evidence prior to entering into a plea deal with a defendant. As a result, defendants not only waive their right to a trial, but also the opportunity to discover evidence that could exonerate them. In North Carolina, where plea bargains are overwhelmingly used to resolve criminal cases, the implications of these waivers are quite significant. Without access to all relevant evidence, and with limited judicial inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea, the risk of uninformed or unjust outcomes is substantial. 

The Constitutional Gap after Ruiz

The Supreme Court’s ruling in United States vs. Ruiz was one of the most pivotal decisions regarding the evolution of plea bargaining. In Ruiz, the court held that the Constitution does not require prosecutors to disclose certain exculpatory material prior to a defendant's entry into a guilty plea. The decision created a fundamental distinction between the rights afforded to defendants at trial and those present during plea negotiations. The Ruiz court reasoned that while Brady vs. Maryland (1963) mandates disclosure of exculpatory evidence to ensure a fair trial, such protections are not constitutionally required before a defendant waives trial and enters a plea. The rationale rested on ensuring the efficiency of plea bargaining, since the process is designed to streamline criminal case resolution. Justice Bryer, writing for the majority, noted that requiring full disclosure of the evidence would improperly force the government to begin substantial trial preparations prior to plea bargaining. The court emphasized that the Constitution only requires that pleas be “knowing” and “voluntary,” not that defendants have access to all potentially helpful information before making their decision. 

The ruling has serious implications for due process. It effectively permits defendants to plead guilty while unaware of elements that could weaken the case against them, or even prove their innocence. In this way, Ruiz limits the reach of Brady, essentially establishing a two-tiered approach to justice, one for trial and one for plea. The problem is magnified in North Carolina, where over 95% of criminal cases are resolved through plea bargaining. In North Carolina, determining when the prosecution must disclose certain evidence, and if failure to disclose such evidence equates to a Brady violation, is a large grey area. Circuit courts have taken differing approaches to the issue, and the North Carolina Supreme Court has yet to address it, making the matter unclear. Additionally, North Carolina’s open-file discovery statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903, mandates disclosure of certain investigative materials once a case enters the discovery phase, but this often coincides with, or follows, the point at which many pleas are already negotiated. In other words, the practical opportunity to review such evidence may come too late.

Moreover, because judges in North Carolina are only required to ensure that the defendant’s plea was made voluntarily, and not that it was informed by all available evidence, many defendants enter pleas without ever learning that the state’s case against them may have been weaker than it appears. This raises considerable due process concerns, particularly among low-income defendants who rely on overworked public defenders, and feel pressured to accept a deal quickly. 

Conclusion

As plea bargaining continues to dominate criminal case resolution in North Carolina, ensuring fairness and due process within that system is not merely a cause for concern, but a constitutional necessity. The Supreme Court in Ruiz may have set a permissive federal floor, but states are always free to go further in protecting the rights of defendants. North Carolina, despite its comprehensive discovery process, still falls short in doing so. The current structure allows for a theoretical, if not routine, reality in which individuals plead guilty without knowing the full scope of the evidence against them. When exculpatory or impeachment material is withheld until after a plea is entered, the fundamental fairness of the criminal process is undermined. This is especially troubling given that nearly every criminal conviction in the state results from a plea bargain. Reform is not only feasible, but potentially long overdue. Certain reforms, such as the “no due diligence” standard cited in the Campbell Law Review, would require the prosecution to disclose all exculpatory evidence pre-trial, regardless of the defense’s failure to investigate them. This would remove any ambiguities as to when the prosecution should disclose evidence, and ensure that low-income defendants who are particularly at risk of being coerced into plea deals would be fully aware of the evidence in their favor. Additional avenues of reform, such as enhancing judicial inquiry into the voluntariness and informed nature of pleas, and increasing transparency and accountability in plea negotiations, can ensure that North Carolina moves toward a more equitable and constitutionally sound criminal justice system. In a system where finality is often valued over fairness, these reforms would reaffirm that the purpose of criminal law is not simply to convict efficiently, but to do so justly.

Avery Sneed is a sophomore majoring in political science.

Sources

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Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

GHC Law Firm. (2022, November 20). Understanding plea bargains: Exploring the 3 types and their implications [Infographic]. GHC Law Firm. https://ghctexas.com/types-of-pleas/

Kilgore, S. (2024). Protecting defendants' rights: Why North Carolina should proceed under the no due diligence standard. Campbell Law Review, 46, 181.

NC Prosecutors' Resource Online. (n.d.). 133.1 plea agreements: Negotiation and terms. Retrieved April 19, 2025, from https://ncpro.sog.unc.edu/manual/133-1

North Carolina General Assembly. (1973). Advising defendant of consequences of guilty plea; informed choice; factual basis for plea; admission of guilt not required, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022. https://www.ncleg.gov/enactedlegislation/statutes/html/bysection/chapter_15a/gs_15a-1022.html

North Carolina General Assembly. (1973). Disclosure of evidence by the State—Information subject to disclosure, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903. https://www.ncleg.net/enactedlegislation/statutes/html/bysection/chapter_15a/gs_15a-903.html

United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002).