The firing of Rebecca Slaughter: Another move in the battle between Trump and independent agencies

By Ethan Harris ‘27

In March 2025, Federal Trade Commission Commissioners Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya received emails from the Trump administration that outlined their immediate removal from the agency without cause. The Federal Trade Commission’s stated mission is to protect the American public from “deceptive or unfair business practices.” Although it is run by commissioners who are appointed by the President, the FTC was designed to remain shielded from direct executive and political interference. As a result, Slaughter and Bedoya subsequently filed a lawsuit against the Trump administration, arguing that the President had violated the long-held precedent established in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, a precedent that has guided the relationship between the executive branch and independent agencies for nearly a century.

This past July, Judge Loren AliKhan of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia blocked Trump’s order and immediately reinstated Slaughter as an FTC Commissioner. Alvaro Bedoya, while part of the same lawsuit, had formally resigned from his position in June, leaving Judge AliKhan with no choice but to dismiss his claim. Following this ruling, the United States Solicitor General quickly applied for an order of stay against the judge’s decision, and on September 22nd, the United States Supreme Court granted that stay. The Court’s order effectively meant that, until they hear and rule on full arguments regarding Slaughter’s removal, she would remain dismissed from her role as commissioner.

To fully understand the issue at hand, it is essential to understand the precedent set out in Humphrey's Executor v. United States. The case was decided in 1933, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to fire FTC Commissioner William E. Humphrey due to his policy positions and political disagreements. At the time, Section 1 of the FTC Act of 1914 stated that the President may only remove a commissioner “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Roosevelt’s decision to remove Humphrey did not meet any of these conditions, as the cause for removal was solely Humphrey's policy position. Humphrey died shortly after his removal, so Humphrey’s Executor sought relief from the United States Supreme Court for the lost wages of his FTC salary. The issues addressed by the United States Supreme Court were whether Section 1 of the FTC Act unconstitutionally interfered with the President’s removal power.

The Court unanimously decided that Section 1 of the FTC Act was constitutional, and therefore, Roosevelt’s dismissal of Humphrey on policy grounds was unjustified and illegal. In its reasoning, the Court emphasized that the President’s powers, while significant, are not unlimited. Specifically, the Court underscored that the power to remove others in office is not “illimitable” and cannot be exercised at the President’s sole discretion when Congress and the Courts have set statutory protections for independent agencies. This decision created the textbook example of the President’s removal power and set clear boundaries between executive authority and the independence of agencies such as the FTC.

Rebecca Slaughter’s case, after Judge AliKhan’s ruling in her favor, advanced to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In that court, two judges in the majority denied the government’s request for a stay of Judge AliKhan’s decision. They also denied a request for an expedited appellate hearing on the matter. The judges cited Humphrey's Executor as a controlling precedent that left little room for the government’s position. In their reasoning, they wrote, “The government has no likelihood of success on appeal given controlling and directly on point Supreme Court precedent.” Their language highlighted just how directly relevant Humphrey's Executor was to the case. The opinion specifically recalled that “ninety years ago, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Trade Commission Act’s for-cause removal protection for Federal Trade Commissioners.” The Court’s use of words such as “controlling” and “directly on point” is particularly interesting, especially since the current United States Supreme Court is now openly considering whether Humphrey's Executor itself should be overturned.

The Supreme Court, in agreeing to hear the case, sought to address two specific issues in relation to Slaughter’s firing. First, “whether the statutory removal protections for members of the Federal Trade Commission violate the separation of powers and, if so, whether Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), should be overruled.” Secondly, “whether a federal court may prevent a person’s removal from public office, either through relief at equity or at law.” These two questions, along with a statement that the Court planned to hear arguments in December and its decision to grant the government’s application for a stay, were the only details contained in the majority opinion released by Chief Justice John Roberts and the Court.

Justice Elena Kagan, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson, issued a three-page dissenting opinion. In her dissent, Kagan addressed not only Slaughter’s removal but also pointed to two other cases where the Trump administration had removed individuals from independent regulatory agencies without cause. She wrote, “Earlier this year, the same majority, by the same mechanism, permitted the President to fire without cause members of the National Labor Relations Board, the Merits Systems Protection Board, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission.” Kagan specifically referred to Gwynn Wilcox, a member of the National Labor Relations Board who had asked the Court to address her case alongside Slaughter’s, which was denied by the Court.

Throughout her dissent, Kagan consistently cites Humphrey's Executor and cites the statutes passed by Congress that explicitly bar the President from removing members of independent agencies without cause. To summarize her argument most clearly, she wrote, “The majority, stay order by stay order, has handed full control of all those agencies to the President. He may now remove—so says the majority, though Congress said differently—any member he wishes, for any reason or no reason at all. And he may thereby extinguish the agencies’ bipartisanship and independence.”

The decision of the Supreme Court to allow Slaughter’s removal to stand until they hear arguments in December reflects a broader and ongoing question: where exactly does the balance of power lie between the executive branch and independent agencies? Slaughter and Wilcox are just two names in a growing list of individuals that Trump has attempted, and in some cases succeeded, to remove from their independent agency roles. The Trump Administration’s broader argument is unsurprising: because independent agencies operate at times in tandem with the executive branch, they are therefore under the President’s full authority.

Over the last ninety years, one might reasonably assume that whenever presidents attempted to remove officials from independent agencies without cause, the courts would quickly cite Humphrey's Executor and dismiss or reverse such actions as unlawful. For decades, that assumption held true. However, the current political climate, which is majority conservative, has created a situation where precedent is increasingly viewed as fragile and subject to reconsideration. Justice Clarence Thomas, speaking at Catholic University’s Columbus School of Law on September 25th, articulated this viewpoint toward precedent. Justice Thomas said, “I don't think that I have the gospel, that any of these cases that have been decided are the gospel, and I do give perspective to the precedent.” Thomas’s words signal a willingness to revisit long-settled cases and provide further evidence of the Court’s readiness to reconsider foundational decisions. The Court will begin its next term on October 6th. With cases on its docket that include Humphrey's Executor, Obergefell v. Hodges, Thornburg v. Gingles, and others, this upcoming term may be defined by a dramatic overturning of multiple precedents.

Ethan Harris is a junior majoring in political science, criminal justice, and philosophy.

Sources

Dwyer, D. (2025, September 26). Justice Clarence Thomas says legal precedents are not ‘the gospel’. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/justice-clarence-thomas-legal-precedents-gospel/story?id=125967044 

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1914).

Firing FTC Commissioners. (2025, September 22). Retrieved September 29, 2025, from https://www.epi.org/policywatch/firing-ftc-commissioners/ 

Howe, A. (September 22, 2025). Supreme Court Allows Trump to Fire FTC Commissioner. SOCTUSBlog. https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/09/supreme-court-allows-trump-to-fire-ftc-commissioner/ 

Humphrey's Executor Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935). 

Mikayla Watts, Independent Regulatory Agencies: What They Are and Their Relationship with the United States Supreme Court and the United States President, Volume I, Undergraduate Law Review at Charlotte. 85 (2025).

Rebecca Kelly Slaughter v. Donald J. Trump, Volume #25-5261. Page 2 (2025).

Skene, L., & Sherman, M. (2025, July 18). Judge restores Democrat to Federal Trade Commission, ruling her filing by Trump was illegal. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/federal-trade-commission-trump-firings-c0b4f6a5169ab54e3c630a39ad5a8aef