Exploring United States  v. Rahimi  

By JaMia Howard ‘28

In United States v. Rahimi, the United States Supreme Court upheld a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits individuals who have a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm. The restraining order includes findings that the individual represents a credible threat to the physical safety of an intimate partner or the child of the partner. Zackey Rahimi, a Texan citizen, was subject to such an order. As a result, he could not possess a firearm. Rahimi was involved in a series of violent incidents with his firearm, including multiple shootings in public places. However, what brought him to the attention of federal prosecutors was a violation of a civil restraining order issued in 2020 after he had assaulted his girlfriend. On February 5, 2020, a state court in Tarrant County issued a restraining order against him. The order prohibited Rahimi from contacting and threatening his girlfriend, C.M., or her family for two years, and the order also suspended Rahimi’s gun license for two years. Rahimi was not too fond of what he viewed as an encroachment of his Second Amendment right, and so he appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning the constitutionality of the statute. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Rahimi based on the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022). In referring to New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, it is essential to situate Bruen within the broader evolution of Second Amendment interpretation. 

The Second Amendment doctrinal evolution began with District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), which recognized an individual right to possess firearms for self-defense. Yet Heller acknowledged that this right was “not unlimited,” suggesting that longstanding prohibitions on firearm possession by felons or the mentally ill were presumptively lawful. Following Heller was McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010), which incorporated the Second Amendment to apply to the states through selective incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment, and lower courts used balancing tests to judge as well as apply means-end scrutiny to assess the constitutionality of firearms regulations. Heller consisted of a two-step inquiry for analyzing laws that might impact the Second Amendment. First is identifying whether the conduct at issue fell within the scope of the Second Amendment right. If the conduct did not lie within the scope of the Second Amendment, then the challenged law was constitutional. If the conduct did lie within the scope, then courts must proceed to the second step of the analysis, which would apply either intermediate or strict scrutiny. Intermediate and strict scrutiny refer to judicial standards used to weigh the government’s interest against an individual right. The Supreme Court decision in New York Pistol Assn v. Bruen made a dramatic departure from that means-end scrutiny of interest-balancing of assessing whether the law “means” were appropriate to achieve its “ends” or goals.  Instead, Bruen required the government to justify modern regulations by reference to the nation's “historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Courts are now instructed to evaluate whether a regulation is consistent with the historical tradition of the Second Amendment. Simply, a court must explore whether the new law is “relevantly similar” to the laws that the tradition was understood to permit. 

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied this history and tradition standard in the Rahimi case and found that the federal statute does not follow the history and tradition similar to when the Second Amendment was created. The United States Solicitor General initiated the petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of the Fifth Circuit of Appeals’ ruling. Thus, the Supreme Court heard the case. The Supreme Court addressed the underlying issue: Whether the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), may be enforced against Rahimi as valid under the Second Amendment. The federal government contends that the Second Amendment permits its statute § 922(g)(8) to disarm individuals who pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others. Restricting a law-abiding citizen for no underlying reason would be a clear and direct violation of restricting an individual right to bear arms. However, in the case of Rahimi, Chief Justice Roberts delivering the opinion of the court held that the tradition of firearm regulation allows the government to disarm individuals when they have been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another. 

Where the Fifth Circuit of Appeals erred in judgment in applying Bruen is requiring a “historical twin” rather than a  “historical analogue.” Instead of having an exact copy of the past law, the Supreme Court is insisting that it must be relevantly similar in terms of how and why it limited firearms. The regulation that was struck down in Bruen was a New York Statute N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §400.00(2)(f ), prohibiting individuals from possessing firearms inside or outside the home unless they presented a special need. Justice Thomas, who delivered the opinion in Bruen, held that the New York Statute was in clear and direct violation of the Second Amendment tradition and history, and did not present a proper historical analogue in terms of how and why it limited individuals from possessing firearms. The New York Statute “how” involved restricting individuals from carrying firearms in public unless they could demonstrate a special need for self-defense. The “why” was to preserve public safety by limiting the presence of firearms. Nowhere in the history and tradition of the Second Amendment is there a requirement for individuals to demonstrate a special need to retain or carry a firearm, nor is there a tradition of broadly prohibiting the general public from exercising that right. The statute prohibiting Rahimi from possessing a firearm is consistent with history and tradition. The government is allowed to disarm individuals who present a credible threat to the physical safety of others and may be temporarily disarmed. 

The Supreme Court’s Decision in United States v. Rahimi reaffirms a critical principle of constitutional law: the Second Amendment is not absolute. In reversing the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, the Court corrected the Fifth Circuit’s misapplication of Bruen by emphasizing that a historical “twin” is not required, only a relevant “historical analogue.” While the regulation must align with the tradition of firearm regulation, it does not have to mirror historical statutes verbatim. Applying this standard, the Supreme Court concluded that if an individual poses a credible threat to the safety of others, their temporary denial of access to firearms is constitutionally permissible under the Second Amendment.

JaMia Howard is a sophomore majoring in political science.

Sources

District of Columbia v. Heller. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/554/570/

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen, Superintendent of New York State Police 597 U.S. 1-80. (2022). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf

United States v. Zackey Rahimi. 602 U.S. 1-50.(2024). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf

Previous
Previous

Congressman to Convict: George Santos’ Sentencing

Next
Next

The Cost of Criminality: Understanding North Carolina’s Habitual Felon Act – Three Strikes and you’re out